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Abstract—Cooperative behaviour is a fundamental strategy for
survival; it positively affects economies, social relationships, and
makes larger societal structures possible. People vary, however,
in their willingness to engage in cooperative behaviour in a
particular context. Here we examine whether AI can be effectively
used to to alter individuals’ implicit understanding of cooperative
dynamics, and hence increase cooperation and participation
in public goods projects. We developed an intervention—the
Sustainability Game (SG)—to allow players to experience the
consequences of individual investment strategies on a sustainable
society. Results show that the intervention significantly increases
individuals’ cooperative behaviour in partially anonymised public
goods contexts, but enhances competition one-on-one. This indi-
cates our intervention does improve transparency of the systemic
consequences of individual cooperative behaviour.
Index Terms—serious games, behavioural economics, persua-
sive technologies, agent-based modelling
I. INTRODUCTION
As we develop systems to model our own action selection,
we gain opportunities to further our understanding of natural
intelligence. Here we document the introduction of an inter-
vention originally designed in a hope of promoting cooperative
behaviour by helping individuals recognise when coopera-
tion is beneficial. This intervention, The Sustainability Game,
is a single-player serious game derived from agent-based
models informing studies of public-goods phenomena such
as sharing culture, punishing free riders, and understanding
contemporary political economy. The underlying simulation
is of an ecosystem of agents competing and cooperating for
the accumulation of resources and for their own survival. The
dynamics of this spatial simulation are based on ecological
modelling and scientific theory. We developed this intervention
to alter players’ implicit understanding of the dynamics of
public goods investment. All participants in public-goods
studies must show explicit understanding by passing a test, yet
performance in public goods games varies broadly [Herrmann
et al.2008], [Sylwester et al.2013]. Our hypothesis was that
the direct experience of the dynamics of public-goods invest-
ment might induce the inclinations or additional intuitions
that would help subjects better benefit from this explicit
knowledge. Our findings bore out our predictions at least
in the standard, anonymised context; however head-to-head,
subjects manifested increased competitiveness. This apparently
counter-intuitive outcome is congruent with known triggers
for competitive behaviour Burton-Chellew2017, so may also
indicate increased transparency of cooperative outcomes.
II. BACKGROUND AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Cooperation is a fundamental strategy for survival and social
behaviour. Contrary to popular conceptions of Darwinian
evolution, cooperation is pervasive in nature. Every instance of
life demonstrates cooperative investment in a single organism
by competing genes. Further, organisms as simple as bacteria
or as complex as humans invest considerable time and effort
in creating public goods to provide shelter, security, and
nourishment [Rankin et al.2011]. In this Section we present
the various technological and scientific considerations and
literature that influenced our development.
a) Agent-Based Modelling: Agent-based models
(ABMs) are computer programs in which intelligent agents
interact in a set environment based on a defined set of
rules. As the agents interact with each other and their
environment, patterns of behaviour emerge. These emergent
phenomena, which are not explicitly programmed into the
model, represent the collective consequences of the agents’
actions. ABMs offer a way to model social and economic
systems, allowing researchers to examine macro-level effects
from micro-level behaviour. Applications of agent-based
modelling span a broad range of areas and disciplines; they
can expose the basic principles of animal sociality, including
humans’ [Axelrod1997], [Gallagher et al.2015].
b) Serious Games: While ABMs are often used in graph-
ical environments, we distinguish them from the widespread
simulation in computer games. Non-serious games are made
for entertainment and invest in believability [Riedl and
Young2005], rather than realism like scientific simulations.
Agents in games should appear believable but be of limited
complexity, as is appropriate to their purpose in the game
and the attention they receive from the player [Millington
and Funge2009]. Serious games fall between these objectives,
978-1-7281-1884-0/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
being designed with both entertainment and non-entertainment
objectives. They convey learning experiences [Abt1970]. Seri-
ous games have been widely used in the military, business, and
education. By providing an engaging interactive experience,
they increase learners’ motivation, time-on-task, and conse-
quently learning outcomes compared to lecture-room training.
Knowledge or behaviour gained in a gaming environment
is known to be transferable to the real world, though this
effect can be moderated by learner and context variables
[Vandercruysse et al.2011].
c) Public Goods Investment and Games: Games of an-
other sort are a standard tool of behavioural economics, aiming
to investigate how we (humans) collaborate to achieve a
common benefit. Typically, experimental subjects are allocated
into groups. Group members are not identified to each other
and only interact through computer screens, in order to ensure
group members do not act out of fear or expectation of
retribution or repayment after the game. Of particular interest
to cooperation studies are public goods games. A public
good is a resource shared by a social group. Investments in
public goods do not necessarily imply an understanding of the
economic payoffs of a such investment nor even interest in the
long-term benefit of the group [Binmore and Shaked2010].
III. METHOD: THE SUSTAINABILITY GAME
The Sustainability Game is meant to be—among other
things—a valid ecological simulation. The game is intended to
communicate behavioural economics principles to naı¨ve users
by displaying the measured impact of the player’s different
investment strategies on the population and individual agents.
A society of agents, called Spiridus¸i, populate a fictional two-
dimensional world (Fig. 1). The agents compose a collective
agency; they must invest some resources in their own survival
but can also invest in communal goods: bridges and houses.
The key gameplay mechanic is that the player selects the
percentage of time the agents spend on food gathering and
consumption, reproduction, building houses for their families,
and on benefiting the entire society by building bridges. These
percentages can be changed at any time during playthrough.
The question of where and how much to invest one’s
resources is complex; there may be multiple viable solutions.
Harvested food (apples, grown in two forests) becomes a
private good. When an agent eats its stamina level goes up.
Once an agent reaches an apple it is consumed and removed
from the game immediately. There is a finite amount of food
available at a given time, so there is competition for resources
among agents. The forests ‘grow food back’; each unit of food
previously consumed, grows back at its original or a nearby
location after at least three in-game days pass.
Following a common simplification in ecological simula-
tions, the agents reproduce asexually. Reproduction is not
guaranteed and each attempt costs and therefore requires
stamina. It also requires a house. If an attempt is successful, a
‘newborn’ agent is spawned in the house. A Spiridus¸’ stamina
status is indicated by colour: 1) Dark green: the Spiridus¸
is full—any further consumption is wasted. 2) Light green:
Fig. 1. Screenshot of game. Player allocates time to given tasks using the
sliders in the top left-hand corner. Clockwise: 1) eating (private); 2) housing
(semi-private); 3) bridge (public); 4) procreation (semi-private). Red agents
are near starvation. Five bridges are erected, allowing agents to cross the river
and access food from the second forest. Rain warns of an upcoming flood.
the Spiridus¸ is of a good stamina level. 3) Dark Yellow: the
Spiridus¸ is low on stamina—still able to build houses and
bridges, but unable to procreate. 4) Yellow: the Spiridus¸ is
near starvation. 5) Red: the Spiridus¸ will stop whatever it is
doing to find food. Unless quickly successful, it starves.
Time is expensive and should be treated as a resource; a
delay in acting may mean that another agent takes advantage
of a situation before you. This is communicated through the
SG’s food ecology. Moreover, as time passes the Spiridus¸i
grow older and eventually die from old age. There is also
inorganic decay from the passage of time, making both bridges
and houses collapse. Thus, if the players want the population
to continue having usable houses and bridges, they need to
continue investing time to these public goods.
How much it is sensible to invest in public goods varies
by context. To communicate this principle, we introduced
environmental variability. As the game progresses there is an
increasing possibility of the river flooding, wiping out the
bridges. If the river floods, it will temporarily expand and
then return to normal. This decreases the value of a long-term
commitment to the public good projects, because a bridge that
agents spend time building could be destroyed. Before each
flood, there is rain to warn the players that a flood is imminent.
This early indication system allows players to reallocate time
spent by the Spiridus¸i on building bridges to other tasks.
Floods and decay are not the only change beyond the player’s
control; there are also the possibility of immigrants joining
the society. While immigration, like procreation, increases the
number of workers available for the construction of public and
semi-private goods, it also increases competition for food.
Notice that if all players play altruistically, more public
goods may be produced than are of use and there may be
no net benefit to the community. Ironically, the existence
of ‘freeriding’ agents may help a population balance its
investments and sustain itself over time [Sylwester et al.2013].
The game is designed so that if a player focuses exclusively on
any single form of investment, the population is likely to go
TABLE I
INDEPENDENT SAMPLE t-TEST FOR PARTICIPANT COUNTRY ON
DEPENDENT VARIABLES M = MEAN. SD = STANDARD DEVIATION.
RPB1 = RESPONSE TO PARTNER’S BEHAVIOUR IN TRIAL BLOCK 1;
RPB2 = RESPONSE TO PARTNER’S BEHAVIOUR IN BLOCK 2;
IPD = ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA; IPGG = ITERATED PGG.
Dependent Variable America M(SD) Europe M(SD) t p
Cooperation Rate (IPD) 0.67 (0.28) 0.61 (0.39) 0.73 0.468
RPB1 (IPD) -0.02 (0.37) -0.03 (0.45) 0.07 0.942
RPB2 (IPD) -0.01 (0.42) -0.12 (0.31) 1.18 0.243
Average Sentence (IPD) 1.83 (0.81) 1.89 (0.97) -0.29 0.768
PG Contribution (PGG) 14.33 (5.72) 15.16 (3.49) 0.66 0 .514
RPB1 (IPGG) 0.36 (5.02) 3.05 (6.52) -1.78 0.056
RPB2 (IPGG) 0.10 (4.80) -0.96 (6.34) 0.72 0.478
Payoff in $ (IPPG) 8.91 (1.22) 9.14 (0.99) -0.88 0.383
extinct. Access to the second forest can allow a larger popu-
lation to be sustained but spending too much time building
bridges leads to starvation. Players’ outcomes are stronger
if they come to understand that following a single, overly-
simple strategy throughout the game is insufficient. Instead,
players need to update their strategy based on environmental
and societal changes—some mixture of freeriders and altruists
in the society is often the most sustainable strategy.
IV. USER STUDY
We recruited a total of 72 participant from our two univer-
sities. Participants received $12/£7 turn-up compensation, plus
a potential performance-based monetary bonus of maximum
$10/£6. We randomly assigned experimental subjects into two
groups; a control group where subjects played Tetris (Control)
and a treatment group with the Sustainability Game. Each of
these groups was further divided into two subgroups, identifi-
able and anonymous partners, resulting to a 2-by-2 study. Par-
ticipants completed in order: 1) Video game control/treatment
for 20 minutes, 2) the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma, and finally
3) the Iterated Public Goods Game. All groups also participate
in the same pre-treatment demographics survey as well as the
same post-treatment standard behavioural economic games.
Participants who played with an identifiable partner sat face-
to-face with their partner. Participants who played with an
anonymous partner communicated with their partner via an
online chat box. Two pairs were taking the study at the same
time to ensure anonymity.
a) Demographics: Detailed demographic analysis was
conducted but is omitted here for reasons of space. To de-
termine whether the American and English samples could
be collapsed for greater ease of analyses, we conducted a
series of independent t tests examining the effect of participant
continent on our outcomes. We found no significant main
effects of continent on our dependent variablesv(Table I), so
therefore collapse the data, leaving a final n of 72.
b) Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: wThe first game in our
list of behaviour economic games is the well-established Iter-
ated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) [Rapoport and Chammah1965].
Participants were told that the game will be played anywhere
between 2 and 18 trials; each game was randomly assigned the
number of trials participant would play. Each trial consists of
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR THE LEVELS OF COOPERATION IN ALL FOUR CONDITIONS IN
THE IPD. THESE RESULTS SUGGEST THAT THE SG FACILITATES
COOPERATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF ANONYMITY BUT ATTENUATES
COOPERATION WHEN PARTICIPANTS’ PARTNERS ARE IDENTIFIABLE.
Tetris SG F p (η2p)
Anonymous 0.41 (0.08) 0.8 (0.04) 17.77(1,39) 0.001 (0.32)
Identifiable 0.8 (0.04) 0.6 (0.08) 4.73 (1.31) 0.038 (0.14)
F 14.29 (1.35) 5.93
p (η2p) 0.001 (0.29) 0.02 (0.15)
TABLE III
GLM RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF GAME TYPE, PARTNER TYPE, AND
INTERACTION ON PARTICIPANTS’ RATE OF COOPERATION IN THE IPD.
F (1, 71) p η2p
Game Type (GT) 2.05 0.157 0.03
Partner Type (PT) 1.79 0.186 0.03
Two-way GT and PT 19.91 0.001 0.23
a single move, i.e., the decision to cooperate or blame, by each
of two the players. Participant choices were made individually
in private, with no discussions allowed between them, and
were only revealed to each other at the end of the round.
Once their sentences were calculated, they would proceed to
the next round.
We first constructed a Generalised-Linear Model (GLM) to
examine the effect of Game Type, Partner Type, and their
interaction on participants’ rate of cooperation. We used this
type of analysis as we had a design with categorical predictor
variables (Game Type and Partner Type) and we needed to
examine the effect of each factor and their interaction on the
dependent variable. We found a significant two-way interaction
between Game Type and Partner Type (see Table III). Table II
suggests that the SG facilitates cooperation under conditions
of anonymity but attenuates cooperation when participants
partners are identifiable.
We then constructed a GLM to examine the effect of
Game Type, Partner Type, and their interaction on the av-
erage sentence participants received, which is a measure of
participant performance in the IPD. (See Table II for means
of average sentence by Game Type and Partner Type). There
was a significant two-way interaction between Game Type and
Partner Type (see Table IV. Table V shows that individuals
who played with anonymous partners had significantly lower
sentences (which indicates better performance) if they played
the SG compared to Tetris. Conversely, individuals who played
with identifiable partners had marginally higher sentences if
they played the SG. Furthermore, in the Tetris condition those
with identifiable partners had significantly lower sentencing
decisions, while in the Sustainability condition those with
identifiable partners had significantly higher sentencing deci-
sions than those with anonymous partners. These results sug-
gest that the SG facilitates game performance under conditions
of anonymity but attenuates performance when participants
partners are identifiable.
TABLE IV
GLM RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF GAME TYPE, PARTNER TYPE, AND
THEIR INTERACTION ON PARTICIPANTS’ PERFORMANCE IN THE IPD.
F (1, 71) p η2p
Game Type (GT) 0.64 0.428 0.0
Partner Type (PT) 0.1 0.751 0.0
Two-way GT and PT 11.66 0.001 0.12
TABLE V
RESULTS FOR THE PERFORMANCE IN ALL FOUR CONDITIONS IN THE IPD,
SUGGESTING THAT THE SG FACILITATES COOPERATION UNDER
CONDITIONS OF ANONYMITY BUT ATTENUATES COOPERATION WHEN
PARTICIPANTS PARTNERS ARE IDENTIFIABLE.
Tetris SG F p (η2p)
Anonymous 2.27 (0.24) 1.47 (0.11) 9.46 (1,39) 0.004 (0.2)
Identifiable 1.56 (0.13) 2.06 (0.24) 3.31 (1.31) 0.076 (0.1)
F 6.14 (1.35) 5.54 (1.35)
p (η2p) 0.018 (0.15) 0.025 (0.14)
c) Iterated Public Goods Game: The second game count-
ing towards the participants’ bonus is the Iterated Public Goods
Game with two players. Participants’ payoff for each trial
payoff = (# tokens kept)+.50∗(1.5∗# tokens in shared pool).
Participants were told the game would be played anywhere be-
tween 2 and 18 trials, with game randomly assigned a number
in this range. Participants were told that the outcome of this
game would also contribute to their monetary bonus. We first
constructed a GLM to examine the effect of Game Type and
Partner Type, and their interaction on participants’ contribution
in the PGG. There was a significant main effect of Partner
Type (see VI). Those in the identifiable partner condition
contributed more to the public fund (M = 16.11, Standard
Error (SE) = 0.86) than those in the anonymous partner
condition (M = 13.40, SE = 0.77). There was no significant
interaction F(1,71) = 2.767, p = 0.101, η2p = 0.04 but simple
slope analyses indicate that Partner Type significantly predicts
contributions for those who played Tetris F(1,35) = 9.52,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.219), but not for those who played the
SG, F(1,35) = 0.196, p = 0.661, η2p = 0.006. While the
interaction is not significant, the simple slope results seem to
follow the pattern of results we saw in the Ultimatum Game
and suggest that the SG may mitigate the general tendency
for individuals to act less cooperatively towards anonymous
partners in the Iterated PGG.
TABLE VI
GLM RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF GAME TYPE, PARTNER TYPE, AND
THEIR INTERACTION ON PARTICIPANTS’ RATE OF COOPERATION IN IPPG.
F (1, 71) p η2p
Game Type (GT) 0.05 0.826 0.07
Partner Type (PT) 5.46 0.022 0.03
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated success in creating an intervention
that alters cooperation versus standard outcomes from explicit
instruction such as for the public goods games. Our findings
suggest that even a short exposure to the Sustainability Game
increases cooperative behaviour in various well-established
measures in the standard anonymised procedure, but not
when one’s partner is clearly identifiable. We had hoped that
experience of the ecological dynamics of the SG would allow
players to better optimise outcomes on subsequent cooperative
tasks, but we also knew there was a chance that the game
could make players more cognizant of a cooperative context,
which can make players act more selfishly [Bear et al.2017],
[Burton-Chellew et al.2017]. We did not anticipate, however,
that the effect of the SG on cooperation would depend on
whether one’s partner is identifiable. And, perhaps, it has not.
It may be that both results indicate increased sophistication in
understanding how to utilise cooperative behaviour to achieve
goals, but the one-on-one context is significantly more likely
to make those goals competitive. Further research is required
to ensure whether the SG makes the dynamics of human
cooperation more transparent to users, or just facilitates their
expression of competitive or cooperative tendencies. Regard-
less, we have successfully demonstrated that games can be
used as interventions to alter cooperative behaviour.
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